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EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE 
CARCERAL STATE 
 Aya Gruber 
ABSTRACT—McCleskey v. Kemp, the case that upheld the death penalty 
despite undeniable evidence of its racially disparate impact, is indelibly 
marked by Justice William Brennan’s phrase, “a fear of too much justice.” 
The popular interpretation of this phrase is that the Supreme Court harbored 
what I call a “disparity-claim fear,” dreading a future docket of racial 
discrimination claims and erecting an impossibly high bar for proving an 
equal protection violation. A related interpretation is that the majority had a 
“color-consciousness fear” of remedying discrimination through race-
remedial policies. In contrast to these conventional views, I argue that the 
primary anxiety exhibited by the McCleskey majority was a “leniency fear” 
of death penalty abolition. Opinion author Justice Lewis Powell made clear 
his view that execution was the appropriate punishment for McCleskey’s 
crime and expressed worry that McCleskey’s victory would open the door to 
challenges of criminal sentences more generally. Understanding that the 
Court’s primary political sensitivity was to state penal authority, not racial 
hierarchy, complicates the progressive sentiment that McCleskey’s call-to-
action is securing equality of punishment. Derrick Bell’s “interest 
convergence” theory predicts that even conservatives with an aversion to 
robust equal protection law will accept racial-disparity evidence when in the 
service of crime-control values. Indeed, Justice Powell may have been more 
sanguine about McCleskey’s discrimination claim had mandatory capital 
punishment been an option. Accordingly, I caution that, outside of the death 
penalty context, courts and lawmakers can address perceived punishment 
disparities through “level-up” remedies, such as mandatory minimum 
sentences or abolishing diversion (which is said to favor white defendants). 
There are numerous examples of convergence between antidiscrimination 
and prosecutorial interests, including mandatory sentencing guidelines, 
aggressive domestic violence policing and prosecution, and the movement 
to abolish Stand-Your-Ground laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, professors of criminal, constitutional, and 
antidiscrimination law introduce students to the case that established the 
popular claim, “The death penalty is racist.” Every year, students are 
surprised to find out that the racial picture of the death penalty that emerges 
from that case, McCleskey v. Kemp,1 is more vexing and complex than they 
had anticipated. In popular consciousness, capital punishment is racist 
because African-American defendants are the primary recipients of its 
barbaric practices, and this is certainly part of the story. The brutal history of 
state-imposed and tolerated application of the death penalty to Southern 
Blacks, regardless of guilt and through the most sadistic means like beatings 
and lynching, will forever be a conspicuous stain on the fabric of the United 
States. However, McCleskey involved a different formulation of the racially 
discriminatory application of the death penalty. The famous “Baldus study” 
introduced by the defendant’s attorneys found that black defendants in 
Georgia were generally less likely to receive death sentences than white 
defendants, and that the racial discrimination related to the race of the 
 
 1 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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victim.2 Prosecutors, and to a lesser extent jurors, displayed a tendency to 
undervalue black life and overvalue white life by condemning to death only 
those murderers who dared to deny that white lives matter.3 
Every five to ten years, legal scholars dust off their copies of 
McCleskey, or download fresh ones, and re-engage with the intricacies of the 
majority and dissenting opinions for anniversary symposia. McCleskey v. 
Kemp has been such an ubiquitous ground for legal postulating, posturing, 
and prophesizing that one writer for a twenty-fifth anniversary symposium 
in 2012 remarked that “little more can be said” about the case.4 The case is 
indeed singular. It singularly preserved the ultimate punishment, a “peculiar 
institution” and outlier in barbarity in the world.5 It singularly foreclosed 
racial disparity arguments in criminal sentences in general, a fact particularly 
salient today given that the criminal system is a, if not the, primary site of 
racial injustice in America.6 The case is also a singularly stunning piece of 
legal literature. Justice William Brennan’s dissent’s devastating critique of 
capital punishment is a goldmine of philosophical, historical, and legal 
insight. It is here that we find the evocative characterization of the majority’s 
position as “a fear of too much justice”—the focus of this Symposium.7 
Throughout the years, legal scholars have offered various accounts of 
the fear of justice that underlay the McCleskey majority’s preservation of the 
death penalty. One of the most common critiques of the majority opinion 
centers on author Justice Lewis Powell’s treatment of the equal protection 
doctrine and the impossibly high burden for circumstantial proof of Georgia 
state actors’ discriminatory intent. The fact that Powell required “smoking 
gun” proof of discriminatory animus undergirds the common scholarly 
sentiment that the primary fear in the majority opinion is that of racial 
discrimination claims.8 I will call this the “disparity-claim fear.” A related 
 
 2 See infra notes 39–52 and accompanying text. 
 3 See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the 
Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 707–09 (1983). 
 4 G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 65 (2012). 
 5 See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF 
ABOLITION (2010). After McCleskey, the Supreme Court entertained challenges related to the 
characteristics of the defendant, method of execution, and procedures used for determining a death 
sentence, but did not entertain challenges to the death penalty as a whole or revisit the racial issue based 
on new statistical evidence. See infra note 261. 
 6 Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, 52 HOW. L.J. 525, 547 (2009). 
 7 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 8 See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 443 (1988); Jeffrey 
Fagan & Mukul Bakhshi, New Frameworks for Racial Equality in the Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause: Why 
the Definition of “Equal” Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When Laws Unequally Affect 
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argument is that the majority harbored a colorblindness-driven apprehension 
of race-conscious remedies, such as requiring prosecutors to account for the 
racial distribution of their pursuit of capital punishment.9 I will call this the 
“color-consciousness fear.” 
My contribution concentrates on a related yet separate remedial fear 
that is so obvious as to seem banal: the fear of abolishing the death penalty—
and the concurrent fear that McCleskey’s success would pave the way for 
defendants to challenge non-capital sentences, undermining U.S. criminal 
authority generally.10 The Court refused to accept the disparity evidence in 
this case, not primarily because it had an unremitting and immovable 
aversion to claims of racial disproportion. Rather, having previously taken 
mandatory capital punishment off the table and being unwilling to engage in 
color-conscious social engineering, the only real remedy left was abolition, 
something Justice Powell was, at that time, unwilling to endorse. And 
indeed, he feared that if disparity claims presaged leniency in this case, they 
could very well do so across the board. I will call this the “leniency fear.” 
Understanding the centrality of carceral sentiments in McCleskey is 
particularly important in this age of mass incarceration. The salience of 
McCleskey endures precisely because it forms the basis for various social 
justice-based and legally progressive political strategies.11 The focus on the 
McCleskey Court’s disparity-claim fear prefigures a common progressive 
sensibility that legal success, if not justice itself, occurs whenever 
decisionmakers accept and remedy identity-based disparities. If, however, 
we understand that the Court’s primary political sensitivity was to the 
possibility of a broad assault on the penal authority of the state, it counsels a 
more cautious approach to asserting disparity claims and evidence. Viewing 
the “fear of too much justice” as a fear of leniency indicates that legal 
decisionmakers are often more sanguine about discrimination claims when 
 
Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 140 (2002); Paul Schoeman, Easing the Fear of 
Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal to Revise the Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
543, 551 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 158 (1987). 
 9 See Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 807, 815 (2011); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an 
Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 141 (1998); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. 
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988); R. Richard 
Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1120 (2001). 
 10 Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial 
Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 510 (1994). 
 11 McCleskey is thus symbolically representative of judicial blindness toward evidence of racial 
discrimination, against which critical race scholars, activists, and lawyers must struggle. In turn, the 
central goal of many equality scholars becomes achieving equality of punishment, not necessarily less 
punishment, in any given area. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8; infra notes 238–250 and 
accompanying text. 
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they can address them through greater penal severity and without color-
conscious social engineering. Accordingly, one should be vigilant of what 
Professor Derrick Bell famously termed “interest convergence,” the 
phenomenon of racial justice remedies succeeding when they reflect the 
agendas of empowered lawmakers and constituencies.12 
The rest of this Essay proceeds in three parts. The first Part sets the 
stage for an analysis of McCleskey by examining the jurisprudential setting 
in which the Petitioner, death row inmate Warren McCleskey, and his 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) attorneys asserted their disparity claims. 
It was a setting involving rejection and requirement of discretion, where both 
optional and mandatory capital punishment had been ruled unconstitutional. 
Part II is an intricate exegesis of the McCleskey majority opinion. After 
considering the explanations that the Court’s opinion reflects an overarching 
aversion to racial disparity claims and color-conscious policies, I make the 
case that the majority’s primary “fear of justice” was the fear of tempering 
penal authority. In Part III, I caution that, outside of the capital context, 
lawmakers can address racial disparities by “leveling-up” punishment. They 
can, for example, address disproportional leniency toward those who offend 
against black victims by mandating high minimum sentences. Indeed, the 
feminist experience with domestic violence criminalization underscores how 
easily progressive formal-equality projects transform into simple law-and-
order policies. 
I. SETTING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL STAGE:  
CERTAINTY VERSUS LENIENCY 
A. The Janus Face of Death Penalty Discretion 
Much of the younger generation does not realize that the American 
death penalty was at one time unconstitutional. In 1972, Georgia, the state 
upon which the seeds of death penalty jurisprudence have largely been sown, 
faced a challenge in the Supreme Court by three black defendants.13 Two of 
the defendants were sentenced to death for rape, while Furman, an occasional 
psychotic with “convulsive disorder,” was condemned for murder.14 The 
resulting Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia was a tapestry of 
 
 12 DERRICK A. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED 
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 165–79 (2004); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education 
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
 13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). I begin my history with Furman, although death penalty 
controversies and the NAACP’s LDF strategies began far before. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum 
to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, October Term, 1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 (1986) (arguing 
in a 1963 memo that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 14 Furman, 408 U.S. at 252–53. 
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judicial opinions: Two Justices, Justice Brennan and Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, argued that capital punishment per se violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;15 three 
Justices, Justice William Douglas, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron 
White, reserved on the question of the general constitutionality of the death 
penalty, but rejected Georgia’s scheme that left capital punishment to the 
unfettered discretion of the jury as “wanton[] and . . . freakish[]”16 and 
“pregnant with discrimination;”17 the remaining four Justices dissented,18 
with Justice Warren Burger opining that the majority usurped legislatures’ 
power to determine criminal sentences.19 Of note here, Justice Powell, the 
McCleskey majority opinion’s future author, dissented separately to 
emphasize his disagreement with Justices Brennan and Marshall that capital 
punishment’s “evolutionary process ha[d] come suddenly to an end.”20 
Powell painted a picture of an America besieged by crime, noting the 
“brutish and revolting murders [that] continue to occur with disquieting 
frequency[,] . . . the several senseless assassinations[,] [and] the too 
numerous shocking multiple murders that have stained this country’s recent 
history.”21 Compare this with fellow dissenter Justice Harry Blackmun, who 
averred to Burger’s restraint-oriented sentiments but emphasized his own 
“distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty.”22 
The execution-free moment in Supreme Court jurisprudence proved 
short-lived. Just four years later, in three 1976 companion cases—Gregg v. 
Georgia,23 Proffitt v. Florida,24 and Jurek v. Texas25—a majority of Justices, 
including Powell, declared that the states’ revised statutory schemes, which 
provided guided discretion to the jury, cured the death penalty’s 
constitutional infirmity.26 Justices Brennan and Marshall, now the lone 
voices of abolition, reiterated their Furman sentiments.27 Although many 
states moved to guided discretion exemplified by Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, 
 
 15 Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 16 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 17 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 18 Id. at 375–479 (Burger, Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting separately). 
 19 Id. at 383–84 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 20 Id. at 430–31 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 21 Id. at 444–45 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing rape 
as “sordid, heinous[,] . . . demeaning, humiliating, and often physically or psychologically traumatic”). 
 22 Id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 23 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 24 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 25 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 26 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196–98. 
 27 See id. at 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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a few states responded to Furman’s prohibition of unfettered discretion 
through level-up measures mandating capital punishment for certain crimes. 
This produced another set of 1976 companion cases, Roberts v. Louisiana28 
and Woodson v. North Carolina,29 reviewing the constitutionality of 
mandatory capital punishment. The revival of mandatory executions moved 
Powell toward a measure of mercy, and he joined in striking the schemes 
down. 
Justice Powell’s turn toward temperance might seem curious in light of 
his Furman dissent’s anticrime sentences and impassioned defense of 
legislative prerogative. Nevertheless, he had also expressed a special 
fondness for “case by case” analysis and jury discretion.30 Such sentiments 
animated the Woodson plurality’s main reasoning that because a death 
sentence is so exceptional, it requires jurors to assess the “character and 
record of the individual offender.”31 The plurality’s second rationale was 
somewhat confounding given this unwavering trust in juries to prudently 
manage the magnitudinous death decision. It asserted that mandatory 
systems were untenable because juries could not be trusted to make lawful 
decisions about first-degree murder liability, leading to widespread and 
arbitrary nullification.32 Woodson’s reasoning betrays a sensibility on the part 
of the plurality that mandatory executions, a vestige of antiquated premodern 
punishment, are simply inconsistent with “contemporary community values” 
regarding the administration of justice.33 By contrast, discretionary execution 
comports with contemporary rectitude when imagined to be imposed by a 
thoughtful, presumptively nonracist, and thoroughly modern jury.34 Read 
with Furman and Gregg, the Roberts/Woodson holdings made for tricky 
legal terrain to navigate. The Court both forbade and mandated discretion.35 
It was between this rock and hard place that the administration of capital 
punishment persisted, now under guided discretion systems where juries 
were to weigh statutory aggravating factors ranging from concrete 
(committing an enumerated felony) to vague (“heinousness”) against 
 
 28 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 29 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 30 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430, 440 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 31 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
 32 Id. at 302–03. 
 33 Id. at 295 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).   
 34 Id. at 295–296. 
 35 See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 382 (1995) 
(discussing this tension); Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital 
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 990 (1996) (noting the complexity of the role of mercy in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
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mitigating evidence presented by the defendant.36 To be sure, the Court 
struggled with exactly how to reconcile Furman’s prohibition of 
arbitrariness and Roberts/Woodson’s principle that death penalty decisions 
must be personalized, a principle that reached its pinnacle in the 1978 
decision, Lockett v. Ohio, where the Court quite surprisingly required states 
to allow unlimited mitigating evidence.37 Professors Jordan Steiker and Carol 
Steiker survey the terrain, concluding: “Th[e] tension between Gregg’s 
seeming insistence on channeling [jury discretion] and Woodson’s seeming 
insistence on uncircumscribed consideration of mitigating evidence 
constitutes the central dilemma in post-Furman capital punishment law.”38 
B. McCleskey and the Baldus Study 
McCleskey v. Kemp posed the most serious constitutional challenge to 
capital punishment writ large since Furman. Ruminating on that challenge’s 
failure, a death penalty critic might lament the providence of timing that 
designated Warren McCleskey the face of abolition.39 McCleskey had 
murdered a police officer, a fact that would garner little sympathy from 
swing justices, particularly Justice Powell whose law-and-order sentiments 
were on full display in Furman.40 Justice Powell, in fact, confirmed this 
disposition in a memo to his clerks after the McCleskey oral argument, 
remarking, “[t]he opponents of capital punishment hardly could have picked 
a weaker case for this argument. Petitioner planned the armed robbery, was 
the trigger man, he shot an officer twice, and had a substantial record of other 
serious felonies. He identified no mitigating circumstances.”41  
 
 36 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 866 (1983) (discussing aggravating factors); Steiker & Steiker, 
supra note 35 at 374, 382. 
 37 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (striking down limits on what capital sentencers could consider as a 
mitigating factor). One might wonder whether the holding related to the fact that Lockett was a woman. 
See id. at 590. The Court’s treatment of aggravating factors fared little better, allowing the jury unfettered 
discretion once it narrowed the pool by finding an aggravator. Zant, 462 U.S. at 416 (upholding death 
sentence where capital jury relied on both valid and invalid aggravating factors). See also Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652–55 (1990) (holding that the “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved” 
aggravating factor was not unconstitutionally vague because judges could interpret it narrowly). 
 38 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 382. 
 39 See Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the 
Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1043 (1994) 
(calling McCleskey a “seemingly sociopathic armed robber [who] had killed a police officer”). In 2008, 
when I was a colleague of David Baldus at the University of Iowa, he remarked to me in passing that he 
believed the case would have been decided differently had McCleskey not been a cop killer. 
 40 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 41 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Leslie & 
Ronald 3 (Nov. 1, 1986) [hereinafter Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald] (located in Justice Powell’s 
McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 111–
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Nevertheless, McCleskey involved a black-on-white killing, and in 
Furman, several Justices, including Powell, invited litigants with compelling 
evidence of racial discrimination to present claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause.42 A 1983 study by law professors David Baldus and 
Charles Pulaski and statistician George Woodworth would serve as a basis 
for the LDF lawyers’ acceptance of that invitation.43 The study, among other 
things, tested the efficacy of a particular safeguard touted in Gregg, the 
requirement that the Georgia Supreme Court determine whether a death 
sentence is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar 
cases,” called “proportionality” or “comparative sentencing” review.44 The 
researchers obtained the case files for all the murder convictions in Georgia 
from 1973 to 1978 to determine whether the Georgia Supreme Court had 
been correct to rule all the death sentences proportionate.45 The good news 
for Georgia was that its system was not completely unpredictable, as 
increased aggravation did correlate with increased probability of a death 
sentence.46 However, a significant portion of death sentences (13–22%) were 
“presumptively excessive” in that a substantial majority of similar cases did 
not result in death.47 
The study also revealed a disparity that would forever mark the death 
penalty as racist. The white race of a victim was highly predictive of death, 
even when controlling for aggravation level.48 Prosecutors required fewer 
aggravating factors to send white-victim cases to juries, and juries required 
fewer factors to sentence those killers to death. The authors concluded, “our 
data strongly suggests that Georgia is operating a dual system, based upon 
the race of the victim, for processing homicide cases.”49 Baldus and 
colleagues conducted a follow-up study,50 and by the time the two studies 
(collectively called “the Baldus study”) appeared in the McCleskey litigation, 




 42 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 449 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 43 See Baldus et al., supra note 3. 
 44 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205–06 (1976). 
 45 Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 679, 711. 
 46 Id. at 702. 
 47 Id. at 704–06. Between only 50% and 30% were “presumptively evenhanded.” Id. “Presumptively 
evenhanded” death sentences were those where 80% or more of similar cases resulted in death. Id. at 698. 
 48 Id. at 709–10. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) (describing the methodology and results of their second “Charging and 
Sentencing Study” of death sentences in Georgia).   
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factors that contributed to capital decisions.51 The Baldus study found not 
only “stark” racial differences in death penalty distribution—the death 
penalty was assessed in 1% of black-victim cases, 11% of white-victim 
cases, and 22% of white-victim cases with black killers—but also that white 
victimhood was more predictive of death than some aggravating factors, 
including a prior record of murder.52 
It is now prosaic to say that the Baldus study was “groundbreaking,” 
but it is difficult to overstate the precision and comprehensiveness of the 
evidence as compared to statistical proof in past cases.53 Considering the 
character of the empirical work, along with the testimony in the record from 
a famed statistician that the study was “far and away the most complete and 
thorough analysis of sentencing” ever conducted,54 it is shocking that the 
Georgia federal district judge found the Baldus study so lacking in validity 
that it could “demonstrate nothing.”55 While a refutation of district court 
Judge J. Owen Forrester’s analysis is beyond the scope of this Essay, the 
district court decision reminds us that faith can always triumph over fact. 
Just as the extremely religious characterize evolution as a “theory” that lacks 
exacting proof while simultaneously eschewing the need for evidence of 
creation, those with colorblind faith that criminal punishment is fair demand 
undeniable, ironclad, and, indeed, unobtainable proof of discrimination, 
while offering none that the system is just.56 
The Eleventh Circuit declined to test statistical wits with Baldus and 
company and instead presumed that the study was valid. Like the district 
court, the court of appeals was unimpressed, but its skepticism related to the 
study’s findings. The Baldus study revealed that the whiteness of the victim 
alone increased the defendant’s chance of being sentenced to death from 5% 
to 11%, more than doubling the risk of death. The appeals court wrote off 
this increase as “not sufficient,” incorrectly characterizing it as showing a 
six percent difference, rather than a six point difference, and noting that “[i]n 
any discretionary system, some imprecision must be tolerated.”57 In fact, the 
appeals court saw the Baldus study as vindication that the system was 
 
 51 Samuel R. Gross, David Baldus and the Legacy of McCleskey v. Kemp, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 
1911–12 (2012). 
 52 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87, 326–28 (1987). 
 53 Gross, supra note 51, at 1911. 
 54 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 908 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 55 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
 56 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 360 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (stating that “[t]he State did not test its 
hypothesis to determine if white-victim and black-victim cases at the same level of aggravating 
circumstances were similarly treated”). 
 57 McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 897. 
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“operating in a rational manner,” despite the little glitch that a victim’s white 
race increased the defendant’s death probability, not by 6%, but by 120%.58  
The Supreme Court similarly assumed the statistical validity of the 
Baldus study but did not endorse it as proof of discrimination.59 By the time 
the case reached the High Court, the defense had amassed unassailable 
evidence of the study’s comprehensiveness and legitimacy.60 Leading U.S. 
criminologists described it as “among the best empirical studies on criminal 
sentencing ever conducted.”61 At least one Justice joining the majority, 
however, did not doubt the validity of the study as proof of discrimination. 
In 1993, the private papers of Thurgood Marshall became public, and among 
them was a bombshell that David Baldus later remarked “had taken his 
breath away.”62 In a 1987 memo to the Conference, junior Justice Antonin 
Scalia stated: 
I plan to join Lewis’s [Powell’s] opinion in this case, with two reservations. I 
disagree with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from the 
Baldus study are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique, 
or by the large number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit 
in the opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could only 
be shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, would require reversal. 
Since it is my view that unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial 
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, 
I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof. I expect to write separately 
to make these points, but not until I see the dissent.63 
Perhaps Powell’s reluctance to endorse the study stemmed from the 
belief that the “Court should not be the forum for an extensive review of 
statistical techniques.”64 Alternatively, he may have sought to allow the 
 
 58 See id. at 896–97. 
 59 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7, 292–99. 
 60 Gross, supra note 51, at 1914. 
 61 Brief for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard O. Lempert, Dr. Peter W. Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E. 
Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel & Professor Franklin E. Zimring as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 3, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811). 
 62 Dorin, supra note 39, at 1039. 
 63 Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to the Conference, 
McCleskey v. Kemp (Jan. 6, 1987) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 148), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles [https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]. 
 64 Bench Memorandum from Leslie to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the 
U.S., 8 (Oct. 1, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington 
& Lee University School of Law Library at 36–59), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles 
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]. Powell underlines this sentence and writes “I agree!” in the margin. Id. 
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majority to maintain the pretense of not really knowing whether there was 
discrimination, as opposed to admitting, as Scalia did, that they knew 
Georgia discriminated but just did not care.65 I suspect, however, that Justice 
Powell eschewed extended exploration of the statistics because he just could 
not fathom how general race-of-victim disparities invalidated the specific 
sentence given to McCleskey, a convicted cop killer. In an early memo to his 
clerk, Powell ruminated: 
At the outset, it is not at all clear to me that Baldus is even relevant to this case. 
McCleskey confessed to participating in a planned and armed robbery. . . . At 
the sentencing hearing, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances: 
the murder was committed in the course of another capital felony; and the victim 
had been a police officer engaged in the performance of his duties. McCleskey 
offered no mitigating evidence. In these circumstances, it is not easy to believe 
that general statistics only could be relevant to whether McCleskey was guilty 
of a capital offense for which death is a proper punishment under Georgia law.66 
The Justice emphasized the lens of legitimacy through which he viewed 
capital punishment and the jaundiced eye he cast toward any wholesale 
assault on the institution: “This case presents, as we know, an attack on 
capital punishment itself. . . . It will not be easy for me to accept this view.”67 
II. A FEAR OF TOO MUCH LENIENCY 
Before I proceed to dissect the McCleskey majority opinion and 
reconfigure it in a manner that supports my thesis, as law professors are wont 
to do, a serious caveat on methodology is warranted. It is often an exercise 
in aspiration, speculation, and even futility to seek to divine the motivations 
of individual Supreme Court Justices. I certainly do not mean to 
psychologize or biograph Justice Powell, the latter having been done with 
care by John C. Jeffries.68 Nor do I engage in a court-watcher’s analytic of 
larger Supreme Court trends, transformations, or partisanship.69 My goal and 
 
 65 I thank Carol Steiker for this point. 
 66 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. to Leslie 2–3 
(Sept. 16, 1986) [hereinafter Powell Memo to Leslie] (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp 
Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 28–33), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles 
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]. 
 67 Id. at 6. 
 68 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994). 
 69 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014); JEFFREY 
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985). For a recent empirical look at the politics of the courts, although not 
the Supreme Court in particular, see Dan M. Kahan et. al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An 
Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 
351 (2016). 
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method is far more modest: to divine the meaning of the opinion from an 
inspection of the opinion itself, other relevant decisions, and statements of 
the Justices, particularly Justice Powell. Of course, there is a fine line 
between analysis and psychoanalysis, and case history must attend to the 
concerns of historiography, but I hope not to wade into those murky waters. 
Instead, the following is an effort to put McCleskey’s jurisprudential pieces 
together in a new, but not novel, way, adhering to the norms of case 
interpretation in legal scholarship. 
A. The Disparity-Claim Fear 
Justice Powell’s relatively terse and dispassionate opinion commences 
with the admonition that an equal protection violation requires proof of 
“discriminatory purpose,” not general impact.70 Significantly, however, 
Powell immediately qualified that intent can be established through 
statistical evidence of disparity.71 He further opined that a “stark” pattern of 
disparity can constitute the “sole proof of discriminatory intent” and that in 
certain cases the Court will find a violation “even when the statistical pattern 
does not approach . . . extremes.”72 This language reads as promising for the 
Petitioner, yet by the end of the equal protection section, the opinion has 
erected the onerous requirement of “exceptionally clear proof” of 
discrimination.73 Powell opines that under such a standard, “the Baldus study 
is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers 
in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”74 
Perhaps the exacting standard of proof reflects Justice Powell’s desire 
to short circuit discriminatory pattern and practice jurisprudence and 
entrench Washington v. Davis’s bright line between discriminatory intent 
and impact.75 In this view, Powell’s overarching fear was one of too much 
racial justice, the type secured through the disparate impact analysis.76 
However, a newfound distaste for discriminatory pattern evidence would 
have been a stunning reversal for a jurist who, just the year before, authored 
Batson v. Kentucky, the most important antidiscrimination case to date.77 
Batson was, at that time, quite singular in its forthright embrace of pattern 
 
 70 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). 
 71 Id. at 293. 
 72 Id. at 293–94. 
 73 Id. at 297. 
 74 Id. 
 75 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
 76 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 316; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 77 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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evidence to prove discriminatory intent.78 In Batson, Justice Powell took up 
the issue of racially biased peremptory strikes.79 Criminal attorneys had long 
enjoyed a privilege of absolute discretion in striking a certain number of 
jurors, without regard to “cause” and without explanation, and, to many, 
discretionary peremptory strikes represented a bedrock principle of fair 
procedure.80 
Batson asserted that the prosecutor in his case engaged in racial 
discrimination by excluding African-Americans from the jury. In assessing 
Batson’s argument, Powell articulated the famous standard for proving 
discriminatory purpose through circumstantial evidence: 
[A defendant] may make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by 
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose. Once the defendant makes the requisite showing, the 
burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion. The State 
cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions that its officials did not 
discriminate or that they properly performed their official duties. Rather, the 
State must demonstrate that “permissible racially neutral selection criteria and 
procedures have produced the monochromatic result.”81 
Far from requiring smoking-gun proof, Batson specified that a prima 
facie case of petit jury selection discrimination could be established simply 
by a prosecutor’s “pattern” of excluding African-Americans from the jury.82 
This history does not readily support the thesis that Powell had an 
overwhelming fear of racial disparity evidence.83 
In McCleskey, Justice Powell did not in fact withdraw support for the 
admission of pattern evidence in jury selection cases, or in housing, voting, 
and employment discrimination cases.84 Instead, he took pains to distinguish 
 
 78 See James J. Tomkovicz, Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to Equal Protection 
Regulation of Peremptory Jury Challenges, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1393, 1403 (2012) (calling Batson’s 
lowering of threshold for proof of petit jury selection discrimination a “dramatic, revolutionary step”). 
The case proved less revolutionary in practice, as judges routinely accept prosecutors’ weak explanations 
for their strikes. See infra note 95. 
 79 Batson, 476 U.S at 82. 
 80 See id. at 133 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he peremptory challenge that is part of the fabric of 
our jury system should not be casually cast aside . . . .”). 
 81 Id. at 93–94 (internal citations omitted). 
 82 Id. at 96–97. 
 83 Powell’s McCleskey case file papers reveal that he was particularly attuned to differentiating 
between civil discrimination cases and discrimination claims in criminal cases. His remarks on the draft 
opinion from his clerk, states, “I am inclined to rely in the text of our opinion only—or primarily—on 
criminal cases that have placed the burden of proving this discrimination on the particular defendant.” 
Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 41. 
 84 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–94 (1987). 
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McCleskey based on the “[t]he unique nature of the decisions at issue in this 
case.”85 This invited a blistering rejoinder from Justice Blackmun in dissent:  
The Court today seems to give a new meaning to our recognition that death is 
different. Rather than requiring a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of 
the capital sentencing determination, the Court relies on the very fact that this 
is a case involving capital punishment to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause.86 
Justice Powell offered weak analytical support for distinguishing 
capital process from the jury selection process. To be sure, the doctrinal 
history of the two processes reveals the death penalty a far likelier candidate 
for equal protection regulation than peremptory strikes. In capital 
jurisprudence, the courts had long problematized decisionmakers’ discretion 
and set forth parameters to channel it. By contrast, peremptory challenges’ 
entire point is to provide prosecutors and defense attorneys an alternative to 
for-cause strikes and allow them a measure of unfettered jury-empaneling 
discretion. Given that Batson had established the necessity and propriety of 
requiring prosecutors to articulate race-neutral reasons for peremptorily 
striking a juror, why did Powell consider it wholly inappropriate to require 
capital prosecutors to articulate race-neutral reasons for seeking a 
defendant’s death? 
Powell could fairly object to any implication that courts could second-
guess capital jury decisionmaking or require jurors to articulate post-verdict 
race-neutral explanations for their death sentences, relying on the 
longstanding precept that jury secrecy is sacrosanct. However, while courts 
may be precluded from probing jurors’ minds for evidence of discrimination, 
Batson makes clear that prosecutors enjoy no such immunity.87 Faced with 
the reality that prosecutorial decisionmaking is not sacrosanct, the 
McCleskey opinion, remarkably, hinges its distinction between prosecutors 
seeking strikes and seeking deaths on the gossamer thread of time, referring 
solely to “the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their 
decisions to seek death penalties, often years after they were made.”88 But 
this distinction is unexplained and inexplicable. Batson challenges can also 
occur years after conviction—case in point, 2016’s Foster v. Chatman, 
where the Supreme Court upheld a Batson challenge to a jury in a 1986 
murder trial that occurred just four months after Batson was decided.89 
 
 85 Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
 86 Id. at 347–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 87 See id. at 348–49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 88 Id. at 296 (majority opinion) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 89 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016). 
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The Court also opined that death penalty decisions involve more 
variables than jury selection, employment, housing, and voting decisions.90 
Even if this conclusory assumption were correct, it would not refute that 
Baldus and his colleagues actually addressed the multiple variable 
phenomenon—hundreds of them—in a manner that far exceeded the breadth 
and depth of the proof found sufficient in past discrimination cases.91 Indeed, 
the Batson prima facie case is established simply by asserting that a 
prosecutor created a white jury through striking black jurors, without any 
empirical evidence attesting to whether or how much the factor of race, 
among the infinite reasons, predicted prosecutorial strikes. Yet, evidence of 
Georgia prosecutors’ virtual non-prosecution of black victim cases combined 
with exacting statistical evidence that race played a role in their decisions 
was “clearly insufficient.”92 
Why did Justice Powell try so hard to shut down McCleskey’s disparity 
challenge, when it was he who created the very Batson framework?93 The 
answer lies in the respective challenges’ relationship to state criminal 
authority. Powell understood that Batson called for “case-by-case” 
resolutions of disputes through re-empaneling juries or, in the extreme case, 
retrial.94 Such a blip on prosecutors’ paths toward securing convictions was 
a small price to pay for vindicating racial equality.95 By contrast, McCleskey 
presented institutional stakes of a wholly different magnitude. As Justice 
John Paul Stevens noted, Powell feared that a favorable ruling “would sound 
the death knell for capital punishment in Georgia.”96 Powell’s earliest case 
memo queried whether acceptance of the Baldus study would require that no 
black defendant be sentenced to death when their victim was white.97 
Justice Blackmun, in fact, worked through the application of the Batson 
framework to McCleskey’s case in his dissent. However, his conclusion 
could only serve to confirm Powell’s anxieties over abolition. Blackmun 
 
 90 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295. 
 91 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 92 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297. 
 93 See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
 94 Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 41, at 2–3. 
 95 Batson did not prevent racialized mass incarceration and its application to defense attorneys may 
have rendered it marginally more punitive than protective. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48–
50 (1992) (applying the Batson framework to defendants’ peremptory strikes); Daniel R. Pollitt & 
Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson 
Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1963–64 (2016) (examining thirty years of Batson litigation in North 
Carolina and concluding that Batson has proven “toothless” at preventing discriminatory jury strikes, 
which is especially disturbing “in light of the dubious reasons North Carolina prosecutors routinely give 
for their peremptory challenges of minority jurors”). 
 96 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 97 See Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 41, at 3–4. 
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opined that whenever a black defendant convicted of killing a white victim 
brought a challenge, the state had to articulate a compelling “countervailing 
theory” of the racial disparity. Given the “magnitude” of the Baldus study, 
prosecutors would generally be unable make an adequate case that their 
decisions were free of racial bias.98 This implied that every defendant in a 
white victim case would have a successful Batson-like challenge until 
Georgia modified its system.99 Indeed, during oral argument, LDF attorney 
Jack Boger drew a straight line to Furman’s moratorium, stating that “like 
Furman,” Georgia’s system “is not operating evenhandedly . . . [and] 
need[s] [to] be struck.”100 In the end, Powell’s carve-out for capital 
punishment in discrimination jurisprudence stemmed from his belief that 
equal protection liberality in capital punishment, unlike in jury selection, 
would be too great an assault on carceral authority for the state to bear.101 
B. The Color-Consciousness Fear 
A separate but related explanation for the Court’s dismissal of 
McCleskey’s equal protection claim emphasizes, not the Court’s resistance 
to evidence of disparity, but the Justices’ concern that accepting such 
evidence would require the Court to compel prosecutors to engage in a color-
conscious calibration of their capital decisions. Although, as discussed 
above, some of the dissenters imagined that Georgia’s capital punishment 
system could, after a Furman-like chrysalis phase, emerge metamorphosed, 
the question of how to reign in discriminatory victim-valuation while 
preserving individualized decisionmaking remained intractable. One might 
reason that the racial disparity issue militated in favor of mandatory capital 
punishment in select cases, but that had been foreclosed by 
Roberts/Woodson.102 However, this constitutionally required discretion, 
crafted in the name of civilized modernity, was also an avenue for retrograde 
racist sentiments to enter into the capital process. 
During oral argument, the Justices struggled with this new rock-and-
hard-place between desirable individuation and unacceptable discrimination. 
 
 98 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 359, 361 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 99 Blackmun suggested Stevens-like narrowing and also suggested that prosecutor guidelines might 
save the system. Id. at 365. 
 100 Oral Argument at 15:22, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/84-6811 [https://perma.cc/H7TE-294W]. 
 101 James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 
1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–86 (2007) (suggesting this as a “less charitabl[e]” view). 
 102 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Powell only spoke to emphasize McCleskey’s “serious offense,”103 
but other Justices were preoccupied with this “tension:” 
O’Connor: So this Court’s cases that have, since Furman, opened up to 
allow more discretion, were wrongly decided, and we should move back toward 
less discretion? 
Boger: Not necessarily. They were based on the hope . . . they were 
based on the strong presumption . . . that [states] could carry out those statutes 
without racial discrimination. . . . 
. . . . 
Scalia: [W]hat procedure could have been inserted that would have 
solved that problem, other than the one that Justice O’Connor has suggested, 
that is, going back to a rigid system where a certain crime, felony murder, 
produces the death penalty?104 
Various commentators offered suggestions for a system that would 
reduce Georgia’s disparities while preserving discretionary capital 
punishment,105 the most enduring of which can be found in Justice Stevens’s 
dissent. Noting that the Baldus study found little racial disparity in the highly 
aggravated murder category, which did not include McCleskey’s “mid-
level” murder, Justice Stevens suggested limiting death eligibility to those 
extreme cases.106 Today, attorney Boger ruminates on whether he should 
have emphasized Stevens’ remedy.107 However, the features of this system 
that would remedy discrimination—the rare-but-guaranteed nature of 
execution—also render it unacceptable to both abolitionists and death 
 
 103 Justice Powell asked, “So this defendant was found guilty of shooting a police officer while he 
was in the process of committing a robbery[?]” Attorney Boger responded in part, “It’s no doubt, Justice 
Powell, that’s a serious offense,” to which Powell replied, “Right.” Oral Argument at 21:45, supra note 
100. 
 104 Oral Argument at 26:25, supra note 100 (first ellipsis in original). 
 105 These range from narrowing to “super due process.” See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, 
at 414–26. 
 106 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367. I hasten to add that in recent years, the idea of drastically narrowing 
the pool of death-eligible murderers while simultaneously making death virtually mandatory for that class 
has gained a measure of support from the many who believe that the system “worked” in the Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev (Boston bomber) and Dylann Roof (racist church killer) cases. See Richard A. Serrano, Death 
Sentence for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Brings Relief to Many in Boston, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-boston-tsarnaev-sentence-20150512-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/2DGL-ZQE5]; Malcolm Graham, Viewpoint, Sparing Dylann Roof the Death Penalty 
Says White Lives Matter More, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article98836492.html [https://perma.cc/P28C-YY8D]. 
The brother of one of Roof’s victims reasoned that sparing Dylann Roof the death penalty says “[w]hite 
lives matter more and that white victims matter more.” Id. 
 107 Discussion with Jack Boger, Wade Edwards Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North 
Carolina (Nov. 20, 2017). 
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penalty supporters. Justices Brennan and Marshall did not endorse Stevens’s 
suggestion that capital punishment could be made racially palatable by 
changing its “for whites only” character and guaranteeing black families 
murderer-execution benefits in highly aggravated cases.108 Conversely, 
Justice Powell regarded the McCleskey litigation as an unwarranted 
“challenge to the validity of the [capital statutes] that repeatedly have been 
approved by this Court and scores of other courts.”109 Powell found it difficult 
“to think of many cases with aggravating circumstances worse than those in 
this case.”110 
Moreover, Powell was uncertain that even Stevens’s plan would survive 
the McCleskey standard, noting that a “borderline area would continue to 
exist” and that “the discrepancy between borderline cases would be difficult 
to explain.”111 To be sure, race can influence the very interpretation of 
aggravation and mitigation, from the malign tendency to view aggravators 
like “heinousness” through a racial lens to a more benign acceptance of the 
leniency sentiments of black victims’ families.112 As such, nondiscrimination 
in capital punishment might require what law professor Randall Kennedy has 
characterized as “affirmative action” for execution. He observed, “it is not 
self-evident why—if race can and should be taken into account in redressing 
racial injustice in employment, housing, voting, and education—race cannot 
also be taken into account in reforming capital sentencing.”113 
Suffice it to say, the notion of affirmative action for death did not 
flourish in the Supreme Court. One may reason that the Court was swinging 
toward rigid colorblindness, a sentiment reflected in 1997’s Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, which applied the “strict scrutiny” test formerly 
reserved for invidious discrimination to race-conscious remedial programs 
in employment.114 However, Justice Powell, who retired before Adarand, 
 
 108 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109 Powell Memo to Leslie, supra note 66, at 3–4. 
 110 Justice Powell’s Handwritten Oral Argument Notes (Oct. 15, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s 
McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 88), 
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 111 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318 n.45 (majority opinion). 
 112 For studies on African-Americans’ tendency toward mercy regarding capital punishment, see 
Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL 
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was not unalterably set against color-conscious reasoning. Powell had 
authored the famous affirmative action case, Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, which struck down race-based quotas but approved 
racial preferences in higher education.115 Instead, as Professor Kennedy’s 
article notes, Powell’s anti-affirmative action sentiments appeared unique to 
the capital punishment context, reflecting a squeamishness toward racially 
distributing death. Thus, although Powell may not have been completely 
sanguine about affirmative action in general, the McCleskey majority’s 
reluctance to racially calibrate execution also reflected abolitionist 
sentiments that death is, in fact, different.116 
Professor Kennedy argues that abolitionist first principles largely 
“determined the response of those outraged by racial patterns in capital 
sentencing.”117 To an abolitionist, the idea of applying barbaric and 
uncivilized capital punishment based on the racial makeup of a case is 
particularly repugnant, even if to remedy systemic disparities. In 2010, 
several prominent abolitionist lawyers and scholars authored a law review 
article criticizing South Carolina’s racist capital punishment system.118 In it, 
they discussed several cases that involved “direct evidence of racial 
discrimination,” including a prosecutor’s outrageous reference to a black 
defendant as “King-Kong.”119 The article recounts a “particularly 
instructive” case in which a death penalty prosecutor admitted: 
I felt like the black community would be upset though if we did not seek the 
death penalty because there were two black victims in this case. . . . I felt like if 
we did not seek the death penalty, that the community, the black community 
would be upset because we are seeking the death penalty in the (Andre) 
Rosemond case for the murder of two white people.120 
The prosecutor’s reasoning, although imprecise and incomplete, seems 
like the type of race-conscious distributional analysis that vindicates the 
importance of black lives.121 Unsurprisingly, the state supreme court reversed 
 
 115 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). An alumnus of Harvard Law School, Powell appended 
to his opinion Harvard College’s admissions policy, which stated that “the race of an applicant may tip 
the balance in his favor.” Id. at 316. 
 116 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1393. 
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 118 See John H. Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina’s Return to the 
Unconstitutional, Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-Furman Era, 4 CHARLESTON L. 
REV. 479, 515–16 (2010). 
 119 Id. at 514. 
 120 Id. at 515–16 (2010) (citation omitted). 
 121 See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 910 (1996) 
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the case on equal protection grounds—a life-preserving result viewed 
positively by the article’s abolitionist authors. However, the South Carolina 
postconviction court did not reverse on abolitionist or even “death is 
different” grounds, but strictly on an Adarand-like colorblindness theory: 
[I]f the victims in this case had been white, and the deputy prosecutor had stated 
that the white community would have been upset if the State had not sought 
death, then clearly it would be an unconstitutional race-based decision to seek 
death, and a new trial would have been required. It is no different when the 
deputy prosecutor states that the concerns of the black community were 
discussed and considered in the State’s decision to seek death.122 
Professor Kennedy’s analysis that abolitionist sentiments are woven 
into the very fabric of the race and death penalty discussion reveals that the 
racial disparity argument was born in interest convergence. Had McCleskey 
prevailed, it would have been by means of a merger of antidiscrimination 
ideals and larger “institutional” critiques of capital punishment, both race-
based (the institution is inherently racist) and nonracial (the institution is 
philosophically immoral). Surely, Justice Brennan would have signed on to 
a death penalty moratorium based on the system’s “devaluation” of black 
victims, even though Brennan would regard as anathema Professor 
Kennedy’s characterization of capital punishment as “a useful and highly 
valued public good” to be distributed equally.123 Brennan’s dissent 
assiduously avoids characterizing leniency as a harm to black victims, 
concentrating instead on the mutually constitutive history of slavery, racial 
oppression, and state-sponsored execution that renders the punishment 
inherently racist, even if meted out equitably.124 This stands in stark contrast 
to liberal scholars who critique capital punishment for denying black 
victims’ families “the sense of closure and ‘justice’ that the death penalty 
affords.”125 
 
to tell the stories of black victims in such a way as to emphasize points of commonality with white 
jurors”). 
 122 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUM. 
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 123 Kennedy, apparently without irony, compares execution to electricity: “abolition as a remedy for 
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 124 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 328–31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 33 (2002) (arguing that 
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Professor Kennedy himself acknowledged the dangers of racially 
distributing death. In addition to the potential that it “might actually lead to 
the execution of more black defendants,”126 there is the danger “that race-
conscious reform would simply degenerate into an expedient tokenism 
designed to save capital punishment[,] . . . that defendants might be 
sentenced to death primarily to create ‘good’ statistics.”127 The Justices 
clearly harbored an aversion to racially “tinker[ing] with the machinery of 
death.”128 Justices Marshall and O’Connor asked Boger how discrimination 
against victims constitutes discrimination against defendants. He answered: 
[I]f I have two defendants at my right hand, and two at my left, and the two at 
my right have murdered whites in Georgia, and two at my left have murdered 
blacks, surely my defendants on the right hand would have standing if Georgia 
had a statute that made killing a white person a [more] serious crime.129 
O’Connor responded, “It’s such a curious case, because what’s the 
remedy? Is it to execute more people?”130 
C. The Leniency Fear 
The majority opinion itself indicates less a concern that reformed 
capital systems would involve affirmative action than trepidation that 
McCleskey’s success would prevent capital punishment (and other serious 
sentences) from surviving in any form. This fear appears as Justice Powell’s 
can-of-worms argument: “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical 
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our 
entire criminal justice system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in 
application to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties.”131 Throughout 
the process of preparing the majority opinion, Powell made clear his belief 
that the “petitioner’s challenge is no less than to our entire criminal justice 
system.”132 
 
Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 473 
(1998) (failure to impose death causes “emotional harm” to “the family and friends of the undervalued 
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Justice Brennan critiqued Powell’s fear of “open[ing] the door to 
widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing,” stating, “Taken 
on its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”133 
Brennan further argued that any disproportionate death sentencing, even of 
those with “blond hair,” “would be repugnant to deeply rooted conceptions 
of fairness.”134 To Justice Powell, however, Brennan’s argument was little 
more than an admission of “the scope of his dissent,” namely, “a system of 
‘statistical jurisprudence’ unprecedented in civilized history.”135 Brennan 
unquestionably viewed the Court’s role as a bulwark against governmental 
overreach: 
[T]he methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly 
been called the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged. 
Those whom we would banish from society or from the human community itself 
often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society’s demand for 
punishment. It is the particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the 
Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the 
conditions of social life.136 
Given Brennan’s impassioned plea, it is somewhat surprising his 
dissent goes on to accommodate Powell’s fear by suggesting that the Court 
could limit McCleskey’s impact to “qualitatively different” death penalty 
cases.137 To be sure, a holding favorable to McCleskey could have specified 
that only death sentences merited heightened equal protection review. 
However, such a result would, again, be unsatisfactory to Justice Powell, 
who was convinced of the continued propriety, if not desirability, of capital 
punishment.138 The Baldus study may have moved Justice Blackmun, who 
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had long “abhorred” the death penalty, to switch sides, but Powell’s 
commitment to the punishment remained steadfast.139 Powell regarded 
execution as the presumptively rational, intuitive, and warranted punishment 
for murderers like Warren McCleskey, of whom he stated, “[i]ndeed, on the 
facts of this case, it is unlikely that any jury—in a state where capital 
punishment is authorized—could have given him any other sentence.”140 
This presumption in favor of capital punishment for murder explains 
why Powell’s opinion equates discretion with leniency, despite that 
McCleskey was not about mandating execution or limiting mitigating factors, 
but abolition.141 Compared to mandatory capital punishment, preserving 
sentencing discretion is lenient, but compared to abolition, preserving the 
discretion to impose death is severe. Powell’s myopic view of discretion 
stemmed from his innate sense that the prosecutor’s and jury’s natural 
inclination is to impose death for aggravated murder. When for racial or 
other reasons they do not, it is an act of mercy that defendants should 
appreciate.142 Powell adhered to this view, despite the Baldus study showing 
an inverse phenomenon of racialized “excessiveness.”143 Prosecutors and 
jurors generally refrained from imposing death in mid-level cases like 
McCleskey’s and did so only when white victimhood impelled them to be 
uncharacteristically severe.144 Indeed, “among those 17 defendants who had 
been charged with homicides of Fulton County police officers between 1973 
and 1980, only one defendant other than [McCleskey] had even received a 
penalty trial. In that case, where the victim was black, a life sentence was 
imposed.”145 
 
 139 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 140 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Leslie 4 
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Powell also found Brennan’s “death is different” argument 
unpersuasive because he simply did not believe McCleskey’s disparity claim 
could be so confined. Reacting to Brennan’s eloquent draft dissent, Powell 
remarked, “Great jury speech, but no answer other than to abolish capital 
punishment, and this would leave much of [Brennan’s] argument applicable 
to felony sentences generally—for example life sentences for murder and 
rape.”146 In the McCleskey opinion, Powell points to Solem v. Helm—a 
holding he authored declaring a petty offender’s mandatory life sentence 
under a three-strikes regime unconstitutionally disproportionate in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment—as opening the door to McCleskey-style 
arbitrariness claims in noncapital cases.147 Those familiar with the Court’s 
subsequent noncapital proportionality jurisprudence might find this idea 
somewhat laughable, given how impotent the Court has rendered the Eighth 
Amendment in checking outrageous carceral sentences. However, these 
confines of the Eighth Amendment may not have been evident to Powell at 
the time, as a memo to his law clerks confirms: “If McCleskey were to 
prevail, not only would other minorities seek to avoid capital punishment on 
the basis of statistics; blacks and other minorities would attempt to extend 
McCleskey to rape, life sentences, and possibly other crimes and penalties, 
relying on the Eighth Amendment.”148 
 Indeed, Powell was on to something in predicting a jurisprudence-of-
death creep. The last decade has seen an unprecedented application of Eighth 
Amendment principles in nondeath cases. After the 2005 Roper v. Simmons 
case, which ruled capital punishment cruel and unusual as applied to 
minors,149 the Court applied the case’s principles outside of the capital 
context, banning life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for minors 
who had committed nonmurder crimes in 2010,150 prohibiting mandatory 
LWOP for any minor in 2012,151 and declaring the ban retroactive in 2016.152 
Simmons undoubtedly brought about a significant transformation in 
noncapital juvenile sentencing. Had the McCleskey Court adopted an 
antidiscrimination rule for capital punishment, it would only have been a 
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short matter of time before defendants began challenging their racially 
discriminatory LWOP sentences.153 
Finally, Powell feared not just the potential for disparity challenges to 
flood the courts, but that judicial recognition of bias in the administration of 
criminal justice would undermine the presumption of legitimacy that 
maintained the state criminal apparatus. Although not quite as obvious in 
McCleskey, this fear was front and center in Powell’s Furman dissent. In 
Furman, Justice Powell wrote specifically to respond to Brennan’s and 
Marshall’s concurrences. Marshall’s concurrence famously invokes the 
notion of a reasonably informed citizenry, stating that “a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the predictable subjective, 
emotional reactions of informed citizens.”154 Marshall concluded that armed 
with all the information about capital punishment, including its disparate 
application to the disempowered, “the average citizen would, in my opinion, 
find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”155 Powell’s response 
to this contention displays far more alacrity than does the entirety of his 
McCleskey opinion: 
Certainly the claim is justified that this criminal sanction falls more heavily on 
the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of society. The 
“have-nots” in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to 
commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens. 
This is, indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but it is 
not an argument of constitutional proportions under the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . The root causes of the higher incidence of criminal penalties 
on “minorities and the poor” will not be cured by abolishing the system of 
penalties. Nor, indeed, could any society have a viable system of criminal 
justice if sanctions were abolished or ameliorated because most of those who 
commit crimes happen to be underprivileged. The basic problem results not 
from the penalties imposed for criminal conduct but from social and economic 
factors that have plagued humanity since the beginning of recorded 
history . . . .156 
While not as extreme as Scalia’s belief that bias is “ineradicable” and 
unproblematic, Powell firmly rejected that criminal authority could be 
sacrificed in the quest to ameliorate social inequalities, “tragic” though they 
were. Powell’s certainty that remedying disparity threatened the continued 
survival of state punishment led him to pursue some surreal argumentative 
 
 153 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 n.38 (1987) (citing studies demonstrating a racial 
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strategies. Powell considered devoting a portion of the majority opinion to 
describing ubiquitous discrimination against many types of minorities to 
make the point that crime commission (and therefore punishment) is 
inevitably disparate. He wrote to his clerks,  
The history of blacks’ mistreatment in the deep South will be emphasized by 
the dissents. But apart from slavery (abolished a century and a third ago), racial 
prejudice has existed, and may still exist, against Orientals in parts of the West 
Coast. . . . [and] Chicanos, Spanish Americans and Indians also may claim 
discrimination.157  
By the time this contention appeared in a footnote in the final opinion, it was 
less a catalogue of entrenched inequality than a caution that the social-
constructivist nature of race and ethnicity allowed any given defendant to 
claim minority status and thus discrimination. Nevertheless, Powell initially 
endorsed the remarkable argument that widespread historical and current 
racial discrimination, which caused social dysfunction among minorities, 
was a ground to reject McCleskey’s equal protection challenge. 
Throughout the McCleskey proceedings, Powell adhered to his faith that 
endemic inequality is “unrelated” to the operation of positive criminal law, 
such that regardless of social circumstances, individual defendants are fully 
culpable.158 His insistence on “case-by-case” analysis sought to protect the 
fragile illusion that criminal law punishes internally bad individuals.159 
Marshall’s “reasonably informed citizenry” standard, like the “rotten social 
background” defense or philosophical objections to the operation of 
“constitutive” luck in criminal law, stabbed at the heart of the shared 
presumption, or self-induced delusion, that there is true criminality untainted 
by the stain of inequality.160 Powell imagined that the criminal justice house-
 
 157 Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 132, at 6; cf. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–17 & 
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them for criminal choices assesses culpability based on luck factors. See Jamal Greene, Beyond 
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of-cards could easily fold under the pressure of Marshall’s structural 
objection, presaging a massive overhaul of the machinery of incarceration.161 
But this fear was proved unwarranted. In recent years, as evidence has 
amassed of the inherently racially biased nature of criminal punishment, 
even the most liberal lawmakers have found themselves in a state of 
perpetual cognitive dissonance, with Justice Marshall on one shoulder and 
Justice Powell on the other. Like Marshall, they recognize that criminal 
prosecution and punishment is about far more than individual culpability—
it is about power, race, socioeconomic status, and other inequalities. At the 
same time, like Powell, they struggle with how or whether this structural 
objection should affect the prosecution and punishment of guilty individual 
offenders, particularly violent criminals and rapists.162 
III. EQUALITY VERSUS JUSTICE IN THE CARCERAL STATE 
The above analysis characterizes McCleskey as a case concerned more 
with preserving penal authority than foreclosing equal protection analysis. 
However, it in no way dislodges McCleskey from its rightful place of infamy 
alongside Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu.163 Justice Powell’s veneration 
of capital punishment in the face of its brutally racist past—not to mention 
his willingness to use ubiquitous discrimination as an argument against equal 
protection relief—demonstrates his ignorance of the racial significance of 
the penalty within American history, especially Southern history. Moreover, 
Powell’s belief that the administration of criminal punishment must be 
totally siloed from arguments about endemic inequalities is the very ideology 
that rendered criminal law the preferred response to social problems, 
including race- and gender-based violence, even as the system morphed into 
the primary site of racial injustice, imprisoning more black men than the 
number in bondage under slavery.164 
Powell’s tolerance of racial discrimination was thus institutionally 
determined. He accepted disparity claims about institutions like voting and 
housing, but such claims were unacceptable when they challenged capital 
punishment. Unlike Scalia, who contested the Court’s role in remedying any 
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institutional racial disparities, Powell’s overarching interest was preserving 
the death penalty, and he was willing to turn a blind eye to the fact that this 
institution was born in and infused with discrimination. Justice Powell’s 
unconditional embrace of the death penalty is racially fraught, but in a 
different manner than Scalia’s tolerance of “ineradicable” racism.165 One 
might analogize the difference between Scalia’s and Powell’s views to the 
difference between fast and slow violence. Fast violence occurs when racist 
police officers kill unarmed black civilians, and slow violence occurs when 
the cumulative conditions of racialized inequality and disenfranchisement 
leave an island vulnerable to a hurricane.166 Similarly, fast racism is tiki-torch 
bearing white supremacists,167 and slow racism is “the white moderate, who 
is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which 
is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of 
justice.”168 I hesitate to use “racist” to describe either Scalia’s or Powell’s 
views and recognize a distinction between white-supremacists and equal 
protection-averse jurists, so I will term Powell’s law-and-order concerns 
“slow racialist” and Scalia’s anti-antidiscrimination stance “fast racialist.” 
I emphasize Powell’s slow-racialist sentiments as an admonition to race 
scholars that lawmakers and state actors’ acceptance or rejection of racial 
disparity evidence is a function of more than just fast-racialist denial of all 
antidiscrimination claims. Powell would have been more sanguine about 
McCleskey’s anti-discrimination interests if they converged with his slow-
racialist interest in sustaining capital punishment. This Part accordingly 
sounds a caution that victim-based disparity claims, that is, arguments and 
evidence that the criminal system treats those who offend against minority 
victims with undue leniency, often converge with larger interests in 
bolstering the American penal state. A poignant example is domestic 
violence reform, where feminists’ interest in fair treatment of female victims 
converged with prosecutors’ interest in punishing batterers, resulting in 
punitive policies that actually devalued and materially harmed women. 
 
 165 Justice Scalia, in fact, believed there should not be limits on “relevant aggravating evidence” in 
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N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1366 
Lawmakers’ and other state actors’ receptivity to disparity claims vary by 
their interests, and the criminal arena is one in which punitive interests are 
ascendant. To the extent that the American penal state is constitutively racist, 
formal equality efforts to treat minority victims fairly by leveling up 
punishment can end up undermining larger substantive racial equality in 
society. 
A. When Antidiscrimination and Pro-Punishment Interests Converge 
Interest convergence theory predicts that even the fast-racialist, anti-
equal-protection camp will occasionally accept racial disparity evidence 
when in the service of preserving some other value. Recall that abolitionist 
lawyers deployed the Baldus study within the context of a death-penalty 
jurisprudence in which mandatory execution was off the table. In this setting, 
they could predict that the Court’s acceptance of McCleskey’s claims would 
result in a death penalty moratorium, possibly indefinitely, or, in the worst 
case, preservation of the institution with a substantial narrowing of death 
eligibility, a la Stevens. LDF lawyers would have faced a much trickier 
strategic choice had mandatory execution remained viable. If the abolitionist 
lawyers thought that the Court would accept their equal protection claims but 
remedy them through mandating or even re-distributing death, they may 
have simply refrained from pursuing disparity arguments. To be sure, in 
cases like Graham v. Collins, conservative Justices trot out the racial 
disparity claim to justify limits on mitigating evidence and, in turn, increase 
the probability of death sentences.169 
Now, a person such as Professor Kennedy, who is preoccupied with 
formal equality between white and black victims in capital cases and harbors 
no preference between level-up and level-down remedies, might balk at such 
LDF restraint. To some, eliminating whatever individual disparity they 
encounter through whatever means is an end in itself—and the end of the 
story. However, many racial justice scholars acknowledge that a given 
disparity is just one among multiple hierarchies that operate within the 
criminal system’s complex matrix of power. Justices Marshall and Brennan 
knew that securing fleeting equality gains through racially balancing the 
distribution of death came at the cost of preserving a historically and 
symbolically racist institution that imbues blackness with criminality. 
Importantly, racial justice scholars who criticize noncapital sentencing 
disparities should bear in mind that there is largely no upper limit on 
imprisonment—mandatory penalties are permissible, and legislators can 
easily create new crimes. Right-wing lawmakers, for example, routinely 
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justified three-strikes and mandatory-minimum laws on the ground that they 
treat all eligible offenders equally.170 If such fast-racialist actors occasionally 
“switch sides,” moderates with law-and-order sensibilities will positively 
line up to support disparity claims that coincide with increased prosecution. 
Mass incarceration is not just the product of racists who relish African-
American imprisonment, pearl-clutching city dwellers feeling besieged, or 
even those with a colorblind faith that “all lives matter.”171 Equality-minded 
moderates and liberals have fully participated in the penal experiment of late-
modern America. They too harbor a “punitive impulse” stemming “from a 
sustained national eidos that has for decades accepted criminal law as a 
legitimate, if not the preferred, response to harms.”172 Like Justice Powell, 
even progressives draw a bright line between their philosophical aversion to 
“tragic” social inequality and their “embrace [of] punitivity for whatever 
they consider true harm.”173 
Examples of interest convergence in the criminal law arena, where 
lawmakers remedy disparities by leveling up criminal punishment, are 
legion. From federal sentencing guidelines to mandatory domestic violence 
prosecutions, powerful state actors advance equality claims as part of a web 
of “fairness” rationales for tough punishment. Indeed, activists and 
lawmakers often frame victim-based discrepancies in the distribution of 
punishment as unfair leniency,174 a la Justice Powell, instead of unusual 
severity brought on by preferred victimhood, as the Baldus study actually 
demonstrated.175 The leniency framing itself suggests a level-up solution, 
which is an ever-present possibility in noncapital sentencing. In the 1980s, 
conservatives and liberals came together to decry the arbitrariness of and 
 
 170 See, e.g., The Repeat Criminal Offender/Three Strikes Fair Sentencing Act of 2006, at 1 (filed 
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those men who offend against women and their calls for abolishing or narrowing the defense, and citing 
cases and articles). 
 175 See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
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disparities in criminal sentencing,176 and receptive lawmakers quickly settled 
on rigid, mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.177 Not surprisingly, the 
regime was a “one-way upward ratchet” of harsh sentences, exposing 
lawmakers’ imaginaire that the prototypical defendant in any given crime is 
always the most reprehensible, clearly guilty version of a thief, robber, killer, 
etc.178 Moreover, through its codification of “common sense,” or politically 
expedient, notions of which crimes are “worse”—for example dealing crack 
is worse than dealing cocaine—the guidelines created greater racial 
disparity.179 
B. Feminism, Gender Disparity Claims, and Police Power 
It is in the space where feminism meets criminal law that we see 
antidiscrimination and prosecutorial interests converge most profoundly. 
During the juris-generative “second wave” of feminism, roughly the 1970s 
through 1990s, feminists embarked on a reformist campaign to raise 
awareness of the unfair leniency afforded to men who offend against 
women.180 This campaign proceeded parallel to other second-wave feminist 
agitation on workplace discrimination, reproductive rights, and wage 
equality. However, feminist efforts for noncriminal law reform encountered 
difficulty in translating proposals into positive law, were besieged by 
opposition, and riddled with setbacks.181 Women are literally “pregnant with 
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17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1988) (observing that the guidelines are not a product of political 
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uniform). 
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Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246 (2005). 
 179 See id. at 256. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court struck down 
mandatory federal sentencing guidelines as violative of the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee. Recently, 
there has been a debate over whether Booker has revived racial disparities. See generally Sonja Starr, Did 
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 180 See Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in Family Law, 
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discrimination,” and yet attacks on women’s reproductive freedom and 
health persist with vigor.182 A democratically aligned government under 
President Barack Obama could do no more than produce feckless legislation 
on wage equality.183 The idea of the state imposing mandatory pay equality 
or gender-based quotas (or any identity-based quotas) on private businesses, 
as under some European laws, feels utterly un-American.184 
Feminist reformers’ efforts to cabin the discretion of powerful male 
actors met an altogether different fate in the criminal law realm. Reformers 
advanced a straightforward discriminatory leniency contention, which was 
not necessarily historically accurate,185 that police, prosecutors, judges, and 
jurors had a longstanding practice of tolerating violence against women—
regarding it as a private matter, an insoluble problem not worthy of 
government intervention, or worse, legitimate chastisement.186 This 
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general disorganization of early police departments and the reluctance of abused women to 
prosecute their husbands, rather than to widespread misogyny. 
Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and Changing Attitudes Toward Female 
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argument about unfair leniency toward woman-abusers converged with other 
phenomena, including intensified criminal law governance, the powerful 
victims’ rights movement, and conservative lawmakers’ concern that 
disordered homes represented a threat to “family values.”187 In the mid-
1980s, the issue of domestic violence reached a new pinnacle in public 
discussion and popular consciousness. President Reagan’s Surgeon General 
C. Everett Koop declared domestic violence a public health emergency, 
testifying in front of the Senate that a quarter of American women, “that’s 
15 million women,” experience domestic violence.188 
The Surgeon General did not himself endorse an aggressive program of 
criminalization, and the report appended to his testimony reads like a 
progressive wish list.189 The number one recommendation for reducing 
assaults and homicides was “a complete and universal federal ban on the 
sale, manufacture, importation, and possession of handguns,” and others 
included “full employment,” “an aggressive policy to reduce racial 
discrimination and sexism,” and, pertinently, “abolishing capital punishment 
by the state because all are models and sanctions of violence.”190 As for 
domestic violence, the report endorsed programs to address “[r]elationships 
between power, control, gender stereotypes, sex roles and violence; [and] 
[n]onviolent resolution of interpersonal conflicts.”191 Suffice it to say, the 
Reagan Administration did not adopt these socialistic strategies, pursuing 
instead its preferred carceral strategy, with Koop’s statics serving to 
galvanize the public against lax responses to wife abuse. 
By the time of Koop’s testimony, President Reagan had already 
commissioned a domestic violence task force helmed by prominent 
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conservatives.192 The task force was then-Missouri Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s entrée into federal governing. The resulting 1984 report of the 
task force, unlike the Surgeon General’s report, called for a de-
contextualized law and order approach to family violence: “The legal 
response to family violence must be guided primarily by the nature of the 
abusive act, not the relationship between the victim and the abuser.”193 The 
get-tough approach stemmed not from a concern for women’s equality and 
independence, but from a desire to “strengthen family values.”194 Later, U.S. 
Attorney General Ashcroft explained that reform had been necessary to 
“transform” masochistic victims into good mothers.195 Ashcroft recalled a 
conversation with a former victim: “She said, quote, ‘I finally realized the 
truth, that I was hurting not only myself, but I was hurting my children even 
more. I was teaching them by example that they deserved to be abused and 
that violence was acceptable.’”196 
Also in 1984, sociologist Lawrence Sherman and coauthor Richard 
Berk published the famous “Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment,” 
finding that arresting men for misdemeanor domestic violence produced a 
greater deterrent effect than a mere warning or temporary separation.197 
Sherman had collected and analyzed domestic violence arrest data in 
Minneapolis and Milwaukee, from which he produced several published 
studies in the 1980s and 1990s.198 The Minneapolis study was his first and 
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least comprehensive study, examining recidivism in a six-month time frame, 
but its pro-arrest conclusion proved to have an outsized influence. Professor 
Stephen Schulhofer notes, “[b]y 1989, only five years after the study results 
were released, 84% of urban police agencies reported having mandatory or 
preferred arrest policies for domestic violence cases.”199 He further observes 
that “the rapid and uncritical acceptance of the Minneapolis findings was 
premature” and later and better studies demonstrated that, over time, “arrest 
often seems to have an ‘escalation effect,’ aggravating the subsequent 
violence.”200 
In response to criticism that he had publicized the powerful study before 
replication,201 Dr. Sherman authored a 1989 paper asking, “When should 
researchers refrain from publicizing results and thus possibly influencing 
legal policy?”202 The article concludes that researchers bear no responsibility 
for policy changes but encourages policymakers to be better empiricists.203 
The paper touts early publicity to “focus attention and funding on further 
research,” reasoning that “[s]hould further studies reach different 
conclusions, publicity about them can influence policies to change yet 
again.”204 This evolutionary prediction proved naively optimistic, as even 
Sherman’s own follow-up studies undermining the Minneapolis study and 
his calls to abandon mandatory arrest did little to mitigate the study’s 
influence.205 Today, lawmakers have little to no appetite for reversing their 
hastily adopted pro-arrest policies.206 
In 2015, Sherman and a colleague published yet another Minnesota 
domestic violence study, this time a twenty-three-year follow-up of his 1988 
Milwaukee study of 1,125 victims whose assaulters had been arrested or 
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warned.207 In reestablishing contact with study participants, Dr. Sherman was 
surprised to find that many had passed away, but not from intimate partner 
homicide. A full analysis of the data yielded astounding results: “Victims 
were 64% more likely to have died of all causes if their partners were arrested 
and jailed than if warned and allowed to remain at home. Among the 791 
African-American victims, arrest increased mortality by 98%.”208 Further, 
“murder of the victims caused only three of all 91 deaths; heart disease and 
other internal morbidity caused most victim deaths.”209 Sherman 
hypothesized, “There must be something about witnessing a partner’s arrest 
that triggers a physiological response leading to higher rates of death . . . .”210 
In racially and socioeconomically segregated Milwaukee, he reasoned, black 
women did not have resources to cope with arrest-induced stress.211 
Today, Sherman laments the mandatory policies his 1984 study 
heralded: “Imagine if doctors were required by law to use surgery, and not 
allowed to test chemotherapy as an alternative.”212 But for many lawmakers 
and antiviolence activists, once the 1984 study confirmed that arrest is best, 
the research–policy evolution simply ended. There is a sad irony in the End 
Domestic Abuse Wisconsin organization’s summary dismissal of Sherman’s 
2015 study: “Twenty-five-year-old data cannot be used to conclude that 
domestic violence arrests are dangerous to victims.”213 The organization 
confoundingly adds, “Thankfully for victims of domestic violence, we don’t 
live in the 1980s anymore.”214 
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Outrage over the disparate leniency afforded to abusers became more 
mainstream throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and by the millennium many 
states had adopted not just pro-arrest policies, but also specialized courts, no-
drop prosecution, and exceptional civil protection order procedures.215 In 
2003, President George W. Bush, in synchronicity with feminist reformers, 
praised level-up solutions to domestic violence leniency, telling domestic 
violence prosecutors in his signature vernacular, “If you treat something as 
a serious crime, then there must be serious consequences; otherwise it’s not 
very serious.”216 Much like mandatory capital punishment would leave no 
room for victims’ families with objections to execution, mandatory domestic 
violence policies gave no quarter to victims who sought leniency for their 
intimate partners. Prosecutors often ignored, or worse, mistreated victims 
who resisted the prosecution and incarceration of their intimates.217 
Elsewhere, conservatives argued that “victims’ rights” and victims’ 
presumptively punitive interests should trump prosecutorial discretion and 
defendant protections,218 but in domestic violence, as the 1984 task force 
insisted, “[t]he prosecutor and the judge, not the victim, determine whether 
the case is prosecuted or dismissed.”219 Feminist reformers went along with 
this program upon the belief that victims’ desires for leniency were 
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inauthentic products of “coercive control” that contributed to 
underenforcement.220 
Today, domestic violence systems routinely involve mandatory 
policing and prosecution, special courts, compulsory protection orders, 
immigration consequences, and de facto divorce.221 Beyond the trauma of 
arrest and prosecution, victims also stand to lose a source of income, a co-
parenting asset, their public housing, the person they love, their own freedom 
if arrested as a mutual aggressor, parental rights if the police observe neglect, 
and presence in the United States if they are undocumented.222 With so much 
to lose and no ability to hit pause on the prosecutorial machine, abused 
women face a true dilemma in engaging the police or even medical 
services.223 The class of domestic violence defendants, which increasingly 
has included women, faces the costs of arrest, prosecution, incarceration, and 
collateral consequences—including ineligibility for public housing, 
government benefits, and employment.224 The domestic violence system 
contributes significantly to a mass misdemeanor phenomenon that Professor 
Alexandra Natapoff derisively describes as a revolving-door style of 
prosecution that is indifferent to guilt or innocence and which devastates 
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25540249 [https://perma.cc/DQ8K-UEPD]. 
 224 See Carol Bohmer et al., Domestic Violence Law Reforms: Reactions from the Trenches, 29 J. 
SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 71, 78 (2002) (reporting on Ohio study that found a 142% rise in male arrests and 
428% rise in female arrests); Goodmark, Should DV Be Decriminalized?, supra note 186, at 83–85; 
Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187, at 832; see also David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and 
Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 255, 256, 259–61 (2007) (showing mandatory arrest statutes correlated with increased 
dual arrest); cf. Dennis M. Cullinane et al., Offender-Victim Body Mass Ratio and the Decision to Arrest 
in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 49 MED. SCI. & L. 200, 201 (2009). 
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already-marginalized populations.225 An objective of mass misdemeanors, as 
Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann discovered through meticulous 
ethnographic research, is to mark individuals, scarlet-letter-style, to facilitate 
the penal state’s management of large numbers at low cost.226 
Indeed, domestic violence law reform has served to mark, but not 
necessarily deter, abusers. In 2010, criminologists Joel Garner and 
Christopher Maxwell released a meta-data analysis of the 135 English-
language studies on domestic violence criminal law.227 They found that, 
contrary to the “common wisdom” that prosecutions and convictions are 
rare, the majority of domestic violence arrests (three-fifths) produced 
prosecutions, and a third resulted in convictions.228 Of the thirty-two studies 
involving quantitative analyses of criminal sanctions and repeat offending, a 
preponderance reported that sanctions had no effect on or increased the risk 
of offending.229 However, in light of problems with “the quality of the 
research methods” of the studies, the authors performed a secondary analysis 
of the available archived data, comprising 11,518 domestic violence cases.230 
The authors ran a total of 370 tests on the data sets to determine the 
relationship between sanctions and re-offense, and the “findings were not 
what [they] expected.”231 They had anticipated variation in results but instead 
found “striking” consistency: “Only four of the 370 tests show a reduction 
in repeat offending and those findings come from one study. Fifty-eight tests 
show criminal sanctions are associated with increased amounts of repeat 
offending. The predominant finding is that 308 of the tests show no effect, 
one way or the other.”232 
I have undoubtedly painted a dystopian picture of the system built on 
feminists’ victim-based disparity arguments.233 Others may assert different 
 
 225 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012). Between 2006 and 2015, 
an average of 23% (95,207 of 413,945) of domestic violence simple assaults reported to police resulted 
in arrests. See REAVES, supra note 217, at 6. 
 226 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 
(2014) (arguing that misdemeanor enforcement has largely moved from an adjudicative model of criminal 
justice to a managerial model, where people are “managed” through repeated engagement with law 
enforcement). 
 227 JOEL H. GARNER & CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL, THE CRIME CONTROL EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL 
SANCTIONS FOR INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236959.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WM9-2LBP]. 
 228 Id. at 15–16. 
 229 Id. at 66. 
 230 Id. at 66, 71. 
 231 Id. at 94. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Several articles discussed above present critical views of domestic violence criminal reform, 
including Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187; Goodmark, Should DV Be Decriminalized?, supra note 
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cost-benefit analyses, tout different studies, and have a more sanguine 
attitude toward prosecution’s liberatory potential.234 My goal in telling the 
domestic violence story is to demonstrate that feminist disparity arguments 
and evidence, by design or institutional predisposition, inexorably produced 
greater punishment. Whether such carcerality was worth it to secure equality 
by some standard and whether punishment is a distributable good that 
uniquely measures the worth of minorities and women are different 
questions. I have previously answered both with a resounding “no,”235 but 
my larger point here is that critical race empiricists who produce disparity 
evidence—especially of victim-based disparities—must attend to more than 
whether policymakers will accept it. They must grapple with why those 
powerful actors would accept it and, in the end, whether such acceptance is 
a case of “be careful what you wish for.” 
C. A Caution About Victim-Based Racial Disparity 
The aforementioned caution may appear less pressing in the racial 
rather than the gender context, given that white women have long been the 
iconic face of American victimhood. By contrast, police, prosecutors, and 
the public at large are strongly resistant to viewing presumptively criminal 
black men as victims. A significant number of white Americans regard 
victims like Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown as “thugs” and then express 
utter outrage at the “racist” suggestion that they believe black lives matter 
 
186; Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 186; Suk, supra note 186; and  Coker, supra note 222. 
See also Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Between 
Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 427 (2002) (critiquing aggressive policing and prosecution policies on race, gender, and 
class grounds.). 
 234 See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Ensuring Victim Safety and Abuser Accountability: Reforms and 
Revisions in New York Courts’ Response to Domestic Violence, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1424–27 (2013) 
(applauding New York’s adoption of mandatory arrest policies and aggressive prosecution of domestic 
abusers); Corinne L. McCann, What Can States Do to Maintain Victims’ Security, Deter Aggressor’s 
Repeated Abuse, and Motivate Police Departments to Pursue Criminals in the Domestic Violence 
Context?, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 509 (2006) (arguing that states should do more to encourage police 
officers to comply with mandatory arrest statutes); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The 
Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1739 (calling certain 
women critics of domestic violence criminalization “pseudofeminists”); Elie A. Maalouf, Note, Tougher 
Measures: How the New Massachusetts Strangulation Law Demonstrates the Need for Stricter Penalties 
and “No-Drop” Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Disputes, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 295 (2017) 
(arguing in favor of Massachusetts adopting no-drop domestic violence prosecution policies). 
 235 See Gruber, Distributive Theory, supra note 218 (critiquing American criminal law’s treatment 
of punishment as a distributable good); Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 COLO. L. 
REV. 129 (2014) (contrasting progressives’ level-down proposals to remedy racial disparities in capital 
punishment context with their level-up proposals to remedy perceived gender bias in homicide law); 
Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra note 172 (critiquing the tendency of left-leaning activists to 
selectively embrace criminalization). 
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less than white lives.236 Nevertheless, racial justice seekers should remain 
skeptical when powerful actors tout widespread black crime victimhood as a 
basis for greater policing or tougher prosecution. Unlike with domestic 
abuse, where the inter-gendered nature of the crime places the burden of 
carceral reform primarily on men (and tangentially on the women in their 
lives), most violent crimes are intra-racial.237 This means, as Professor 
Kennedy pointed out in the capital context, that “valuing” minority victims 
through intensifying criminal policing and punishment has the grave 
potential to increase incarceration of minorities overall.238 
Of course, state actors theoretically could pursue a Koop-public health 
route over an Ashcroft-punitive route. Critiquing leniency toward those who 
offend against African-Americans could produce positive developments, 
such as de-escalation training and proper criminal and civil accountability 
for murderous police officers.239 Nevertheless, this is not a Koop moment, 
and emphasizing minority victimhood risks greater police and prosecutorial 
presence in the very neighborhoods where they have sown the most mischief. 
Right now, the federal government has offered a part-political, part-
 
 236 See Jonathan Capehart, Pictures Put Trayvon Martin on Trial, WASH. POST (May 28, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/05/28/pictures-put-trayvon-martin-on-
trial [https://perma.cc/7VUB-84WB] (blasting defense attorney for releasing “unsavory” images intended 
to portray Martin as a “thug”); Jon Swaine, Lawyer Urged Prosecutor After Ferguson Shooting: ‘Do the 
Right Thing’ for Police, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/sep/22/ferguson-michael-brown-shooting-prosecutor-email [https://perma.cc/5QSM-JTDX] 
(observing that during the prosecution’s investigation of the Michael Brown shooting, a senior 
investigator sent an email to the prosecutor describing Brown as a “thug” and stating that all the evidence 
supported the officer’s side of the story); Daniel Victor, Why ‘All Lives Matter’ Is Such a Perilous Phrase, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/us/all-lives-matter-black-lives-
matter.html [https://perma.cc/4S6B-MB26] (describing the controversy surrounding the usage of the “all 
lives matter” phrase). 
 237 See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, NCJ 236018, 13 (Nov. 2011), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZM9-P7LJ] (finding that 
between 1980 and 2008, 84% of white victims were killed by Whites and 9% of black victims were killed 
by Blacks). 
 238 See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. 
 239 See, e.g., Nick Wing, Cops in this City Haven’t Killed Anyone Since 2015. Here’s One Reason 
Why., HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2017, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/salt-lake-
city-police-de-escalation_us_591c9070e4b03b485cae1129 [https://perma.cc/C3W8-27DQ] (discussing 
de-escalation training of police in Salt Lake City, Utah). However, policing reformist sentiments might 
also converge with commercial interests. The widespread solution to excessive force has been to employ 
body cameras, at millions of dollars of costs to local and state governments and millions of dollars of 
private profits, with little if no benefit. Amanda Ripley & Timothy Williams, Body Cameras Have Little 
Effect on Police Behavior, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/
20/us/police-body-camera-study.html [https://perma.cc/L2UB-YDTM] (despite the fact that the “federal 
government has given police departments more than $40 million to invest in body cameras, and state and 
local authorities have spent many millions more,” body cameras have shown little effect on police 
conduct). 
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hysterical response to the “epidemic” of “black-on-black” violence in 
Chicago—in President Donald Trump’s words, American “carnage,” for 
which he has threatened to “send[] in [the] Fed[s]” to address the problem.240 
Invoking racial imagery of Obama’s “hometown,” Trump lamented that 
“nobody talks about” the black murder victims.241 During the 2016 campaign, 
Trump tweeted about Chicago Bull’s star Dwyane Wade’s cousin’s tragic 
killing: “Dwayne [sic] Wade’s cousin was just shot and killed walking her 
baby in Chicago. Just what I have been saying. African-Americans will 
VOTE TRUMP!”242 Community activists on the ground in Chicago urged 
economic, educational, and social interventions, as well as gun control.243 In 
response, Trump’s press secretary Sarah Sanders doubled down on racialized 
criminality sentiments, stating, “it’s a crime problem . . . [and] crime is 
probably driven by morality more than anything else.”244 But even to a 
nonracist, a carceral solution might look promising. One African-American 
journalist counseled the Chicago black community to make a “tough 
choice[],” explaining that “[m]andatory sentencing is a touchy subject for 
many African-Americans who fear, justifiably so, that there would be a 
disproportionate negative impact on blacks. But don’t the repeat offenders 
 
 240 Philip Bump, America’s Big Issue is ‘Black Africans’ Killing Each Other, Sebastian Gorka Says, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/10/24/americas-
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(criticizing a statistical graph retweeted by Trump); Jeremy Gorner, As Feds Help Chicago on Guns, 
Trump Aide Says City’s Crime More About ‘Morality,’ CHI. TRIB. (June 30, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-federal-agents-gun-crimes-trump-20170630-
story.html [https://perma.cc/9U3H-PSKQ]; Timothy Mclaughlin & Doina Chiacu, Trump Says He Is 
Sending Federal Help to Fight Chicago Crime, REUTERS (June 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-chicago/trump-says-he-is-sending-federal-help-to-fight-chicago-crime-
idUSKBN19L1JB [https://perma.cc/8W5Z-NANN].  
 241 Rick Pearson & Monique Garcia, Trump Cites Chicago Gun Violence in Speech, CHI. TRIB. (July 
22, 2016, 7:22 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-donald-trump-chicago-
violence-speech-met-0722-20160721-story.html [https://perma.cc/LAA6-N6VT] (covering Trump’s 
speech criticizing Obama’s policies and Chicago’s gun violence). 
 242 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2016, 9:26 AM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/769571710924263424 [https://perma.cc/25SA-VUHW]. 
 243 See Adam Gabbatt, ‘It Won’t Stop the Murders’: Why Chicago’s Activists Oppose Trump’s ‘Gun 
Strike Force’, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2017, 7:11 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jul/10/
chicago-trump-gun-violence-activists [https://perma.cc/2FZ9-J387] (observing grassroots opposition to 
Trump’s stance on Chicago’s gun violence); Jonathan Parks-Ramage, These People Dedicate Their Lives 
to Ending Gun Violence in Chicago, VICE (Aug. 15, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://impact.vice.com/en_us/
article/zmmnyx/these-people-dedicate-their-lives-to-ending-gun-violence-in-chicago 
[https://perma.cc/EM5D-5ZZT] (discussing grassroots approaches to combating Chicago’s gun 
violence). 
 244 See Lincoln Anthony Blades, Trump’s Obsession with Chicago, Explained, TEEN VOGUE (July 
6, 2017, 10:27 AM), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/trumps-obsession-with-chicago-explained 
[https://perma.cc/G9UA-BGQH]. 
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responsible for this astounding murder rate of African-Americans cause as 
much harm?”245 
Elsewhere, racial justice theorists struggle with the self-defense 
doctrine, and particularly stand-your-ground (SYG) laws, which have 
become a symbol of racial injustice since George Zimmerman, citizen 
watchman and “wannabe” cop, was acquitted for stalking and shooting 
unarmed black teen Trayvon Martin in Florida, an SYG state.246 The primary 
feature of stand your ground is to eliminate the “duty to retreat” from self-
defense law and permit a threatened person to use force even if he can safely 
retreat.247 A majority of states, through legislation or common law, adopted 
SYG. In 2015, a group of sociologists examined cases from 2005–2013 
identified as SYG cases by the Tampa Tribune. Like the Baldus study, they 
found that killers of white victims were more likely to be convicted for a 
variety of legal reasons.248 The subsequent headlines proclaimed, “‘Stand 
Your Ground’ Laws Are Racist, New Study Reveals.”249 The authors, 
comparing Florida self-defense law to the “three-fifths compromise,” 
suggested a law reform project of “repeal[ing] biased laws that perpetuate 
institutionalized racism.”250 
After the Zimmerman case, critics frequently asserted that SYG 
primarily benefits Whites who kill Blacks. The 2015 study, however, found 
only a pro-white-victim bias among the self-defense cases analyzed. 
 
 245 Dahleen Glanton, With 500 Homicides in Chicago, Time for African-Americans to Get Tough on 
Crime, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 7, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-
violence-african-americans-glanton-20160907-column.html [https://perma.cc/SKL2-57V8]. 
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Defendant Convictions in Florida, 142 SOC. SCI. & MED. 194 (2015). The study controlled for five other 
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Moreover, it did not examine whether Florida self-defense outcomes became 
more disparate after adoption of SYG or whether Florida outcomes were 
more disparate than those in non-SYG jurisdictions. A few studies of this 
nature exist, and they attest that all self-defense case outcomes exhibit race 
disparities, but SYG makes these disparities not so much worse as 
different.251 In 2012, researcher Jon Roman released a study that compared 
justification rates for cases with attributes of the Trayvon Martin case (male 
strangers involved in a one-on-one conflict with a gun) in non-SYG and SYG 
jurisdictions. The effects were complex. The justification rates of black-on-
black killings remained constant. SYG increased the justification rates of 
white-on-black killings (from 41.14% to 44.71%) and black-on-white 
killings (from 7.69% versus 11.10%), rendering black-on-white killings 
more justified than black-on-black killings (11.10% versus 9.94%). 
However, SYG most profoundly impacted justification rates for white-on-
white killings, which nearly doubled from 12.95% to 23.58%.252 The most 
salient racial effect of SYG was to reduce the privilege afforded to white 
victims, which primarily inures to the benefit of white killers. 
The 2015 SYG study simply confirmed what Baldus found and Powell 
feared: Wherever there is discretion in the criminal system, whether it is a 
prosecutor’s decision to seek capital punishment or a jury’s decision that a 
defendant acted in self-defense, white victimhood predicts severity. In self-
defense law, decisionmakers resist viewing a white victim as an attacker. 
However, emphasizing this victim-based disparity as proof positive that 
Florida self-defense law is racist poses risks that were not faced by the LDF 
lawyers in McCleskey. In theory, the self-defense disparity could be 
addressed through a level-down remedy, for example, encouraging 
prosecutors and jurors to more readily regard white victims as threatening 
and their attackers as justified (and given Roman’s evidence, the SYG 
doctrine might precisely do this). However, the “stand your ground is racist” 
argument necessarily prefigures a level-up remedy, where SYG is eliminated 
so that defendants who claim self-defense against black and white victims 
alike are more likely to be convicted. Now, eliminating SYG may be 
 
 251 See, e.g., JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INSTITUTE, RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR 
GROUND LAWS: ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 9 (July 2013), 
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Series, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18187 [https://perma.cc/DD56-
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warranted for independent symbolic reasons. The doctrine arguably has an 
institutionally racist, three-fifths-style character, given its history of 
protecting the “true man” from “savages” and its current residence in the 
racially fraught gun-loving right wing.253 But, eliminating the defense for 
symbolic reasons comes at the cost of potentially increasing convictions of 
black defendants. 
The interests that converged as the Florida stand-your-ground saga 
played out are illuminating. Many race critics called for repeal, which would 
make it easier for Florida prosecutors to convict defendants.254 That position 
garnered support from gun-control-oriented Democratic legislators and 
crime-control-oriented prosecutors. This included the prosecutor in 
Zimmerman’s case, Angela Corey, an infamous death penalty proponent 
abhorred by abolitionists, social justice advocates, and race critics alike.255 
Also critiquing the state of SYG law and policy were feminist and racial 
justice supporters of Marissa Alexander, a black woman convicted for 
shooting at her estranged abusive husband and his children. She too had been 
prosecuted by Corey and attempted unsuccessfully to assert an SYG defense. 
Alexander and those in her camp, in diametric opposition to Trayvon Martin 
supporters and Florida Democrats, supported the level-down position of 
making the Florida SYG law broader and easier to invoke by all defendants, 
including minority and female defendants. 
Alexander supporters faulted Corey for pursuing charges against 
Alexander at all and criticized the judge for denying her immunity from 
prosecution under the SYG law’s unusual pretrial immunity provision.256 
Alexander called for significant legal reforms, including creating a 
presumption in favor of immunity, extending SYG protections to so-called 
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warning shots, and reducing penalties for firearm offenses.257 Alexander’s 
efforts won support from state Republicans and the National Rifle 
Association (NRA), as well as from public defenders.258 Alexander’s position 
won the day, with laws expanding SYG and reducing sentences for certain 
firearms offenses—a rare victory for public defenders. However, this level-
down solution to perceived disparity was largely due to the overwhelming 
influence of the NRA in the state, and marginalized criminal defendants 
elsewhere rarely enjoy such powerful backing. 
Preferences for white victimhood can exist whenever defenses and 
sentencing regimes give prosecutors and jurors a measure of discretion. 
Thus, like Justice Stevens’s “for whites only” critique of capital punishment, 
one could advance an argument against the entire self-defense doctrine, 
asserting that it is better to have no self-defense than a self-defense stamped 
“for those who kill blacks only.”259 If we adopt the program of eliminating 
any discretionary doctrine that results in more leniency toward those who 
offend against Blacks than those who offend against Whites, no defense is 
safe. For victimless crimes, one has grounds to worry about the fate of 
alternative sanctions, like diversion, that tend to disproportionately favor 
white defendants. Notwithstanding the NRA’s love affair with self-defense, 
law-and-order sentiments still rule, and decarceral principles and programs 
are perpetually on shaky ground. I thus harbor my own can-of-worms fear, 
not that disparity claims will crash the system as Powell prophesized, but 
that they will lead to level-up solutions that render minority defendants 
vulnerable to increased policing, prosecution, and incarceration. 
CONCLUSION 
Researchers’ and advocates’ choices matter, and they should be made 
with awareness of their potential impact. Legal reform does not ebb and flow 
with the best evidence, as Dr. Sherman once hoped. Empirical study and law 
reform expend serious political, academic, and financial capital. Carceral 
reforms that ride in on a wave of bipartisan support for disparately treated 
minority victims may prove difficult or impossible to reverse. Accordingly, 
before the wheels are set in motion, one must determine the extent to which 
disparity claims have the potential to “lie[] about like a loaded weapon, ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an 
urgent need.”260 Take stock in the beginning or end up like Justice Powell 
who, in his retirement, observed the death penalty become more irrational 
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and unjustifiable, and realized that it was he who had brought the 
“evolutionary process . . . suddenly to an end.”261 
  
 
 261 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430–31 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Steiker, supra 
note 6 (observing that McCleskey effectively foreclosed future challenges to racial discrimination in the 
imposition of the death penalty). 
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